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The future seemed bright for the English-born governor 
and onetime canon lawyer when, on a cold Saturday afternoon 
in February, 1763, Bostonians cheered as he walked out onto 
the small balcony of the Town House. He read aloud a brief 
statement, a royal proclamation, announcing that the long war 
with France was finally over. A “general Joy was difused thro’ all 
Ranks” of townspeople crammed into the streets below, reported 
one newspaper, before Francis Bernard politely took his leave of 
the crowd.  
Only for the most pessimistic of New Englanders were the 
signs ominous. Looking on was a brilliant civil and maritime 
lawyer who had astonished peers with his audacity to challenge 
in court the legality of a vital instrument of royal government. 
James Otis Jr. would often confound his admirers with his 
unpredictability and vivacious mind, but of one thing he had 
never been more certain: the war’s end promised to awaken 
dormant conflicts of interest between the king’s loyal American 
subjects and an imperial government in London unappreciative 
of the many sacrifices they had made in the struggle against the 
French and the Indians.  
Of particular concern to Otis was the role which royal 
officials like Bernard would play in Britain’s efforts to revitalise 
royal government. Bernard might invite the colonists to enjoy the 
benefits of empire, but his every word, his every step, seemed 
beguiling, and mindful of Britain’s hitherto postponed intention 
to reform the colonial system. The triumph of arms heralded 
America’s coming of age, with the prospect of sharing in the 
wealth of empire, but the people of the Massachusetts 
Commonwealth, Otis chided, must be vigilant in shadowing 
“weak and wicked” officials whose “Jealousies” and designs were 
fermenting  “in the Blackness of Darkness.”  Otis’s sickly 
colleague, Oxenbridge Thacher, had had similar bouts of 
pessimism ever since Bernard had become governor and Canada 
taken from the French: “we seem to be in that deep sleep or 
stupor that Cicero describes his country to be in a year or two 
before the civil wars broke out.”1  
To those Americans who risked their lives and property in 
civil war and rebellion against British rule twelve years later, Sir 
Francis Bernard was the apotheosis of British colonialism and 
an implacable arch-enemy of the American struggle for self-
                                       
1Adapted from Boston Newsletter, February 10, 1763; James Otis's speech on 
election as moderator of the Boston town Meeting, Boston Newsletter, March 24, 
1763; Oxenbridge Thacher to Benjamin Prat, n.p. n.d., [1762], Procs. MHS, first 
series, 20 (1883), 46. 
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government. Bernard’s adversaries included some of the 
Revolution’s most venerated leaders, such as Otis’s friend 
Samuel Adams, the most influential of Boston’s popular 
politicians, and Samuel’s cousin John, a promising lawyer and 
future U.S. president.  
They and other patriots believed that the movement for 
American self-determination originated during Bernard’s 
administration of 1760-1771, when the colonists first 
campaigned against the reform of the trade laws and the 
introduction of parliamentary taxation.  Bernard’s assurances 
that he embodied the patrician ideal of a non-partisan 
administrator were contradicted by the ease with which he made 
enemies: lawyers and legislators like Otis who thought him 
woefully ignorant of colonial interpretations of constitutional law; 
the merchants, whom Otis represented in the law courts, and for 
whom Bernard promised much and delivered little; and the 
artisans, caulkers, shipwrights, and labourers of Boston’s 
wharves and ropewalks who were to become the lawyers’ and 
merchants’ most determined supporters.  
Bernard was described as rapacious and devious by all but 
his most intimate friends in America. There is nothing 
extraordinary in Crown officials like Bernard being so verbally 
abused. He lived in an age where diatribe and parody were 
among the most  effective political tools. But such astringency, 
as displayed by Otis, the Adamses, and other colonial leaders, 
was more than casual, for the  accusations of disloyalty and 
treachery which Bernard and the New Englanders levelled at 
each other intruded in the formulation and execution of British 
colonial policy when sensitive diplomacy was required to prevent 
further deterioration in British-colonial relations.  
First, Bernard was wrongly accused of hatching the hated-
Stamp Act, which introduced parliamentary taxation in 1765. 
Then the colonists uncovered more substantive evidence of 
Bernard’s other misdemeanours: of colluding with corrupt 
customs officers to defraud the Treasury; of engaging in shady 
land dealings; and of turning British ministers and MPs against 
the Americans.  It was widely believed that Bernard had engaged 
in a campaign of disinformation to blacken the characters of 
Massachusetts’s political leaders--those who deigned to thwart 
his naked ambition. More seriously, it was said that Bernard 
had contrived to bring British Regulars to Boston in 1768 to 
deter rioters, by wilfully suggesting that popular resistance to 
the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts had brought the colony to 
the edge of rebellion and sedition. After the troops arrived, 
Bernard urged Britain to undertake a root and branch reform of 
the provincial legislature, judiciary, and magistracy, and the 
abolition of the cherished province Charter of government, 
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granted in 1691. The publication of Bernard’s correspondence 
with ministers in April 1769, in which such baleful topics were 
discussed, was the immediate cause of his public disgrace. It 
prompted a sensational attempt by the Massachusetts 
legislature to have Bernard dismissed from office, and 
impeached by  the Privy Council.  
While Bernard was exonerated, the bitter controversy 
highlighted the extent to which disputes over Bernard’s 
administration were integral to wider disagreements between the 
colonists and Britain over policy. Most colonists had come to the 
conclusion that well-connected royal officials such as Bernard 
were prepared to sacrifice colonial liberties for the sake of their 
own self-interest. One citizen was so moved by the fervour 
surrounding Bernard’s ignominious departure as to scratch in a 
window pane that this day “August 2d 1769/The 
infamas/Govener left/our town.”2  
 Saddled with a hostile, intransigent governor like Bernard, 
it is no wonder the colonists saw themselves as victims of a 
British conspiracy. In this context, Bernard Bailyn’s seminal 
study of revolutionary ideology resolved the paradox of why 
relatively stable, prosperous colonial elites came to articulate the 
revolutionary doctrines of being at liberty to make and unmake 
governments and to dissolve the bonds of allegiance with the 
Crown.3  
Francis Bernard, then, is historically important for who he 
was, what he did, and what he represented. Bernard 
experienced notoriety in his own lifetime and his “infamy” is,  as 
it were, a historiographical truism in interpretations of the 
origins the Revolution.  
The process of demonising Bernard was taken forward by 
patriot historians in the late eighteenth-century and completed 
by George Bancroft and other nationalist scholars in the 
nineteenth century. While these historians denounced the 
incompetence and corruption of Bernard, they paradoxically, 
attributed to him a near mastery of real politick; the net effect 
was to reinforce Manichean images of George III’s servants and 
their American opponents in most popular historical writing.4  
Provincial politics during Bernard’s administration have 
been thoroughly researched. However, the enduring notion that 
the Revolutionary War of 1775-1783 was fought to preserve 
American rights and liberties from British encroachments has 
inevitably simplified interpretations of the roles of Crown officials 
                                       
2Museum artefact no.0170, MHS, and Procs. MHS, first series, 13 (1874-1875), 451. 
3Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1967), vi, 22-23, 109, 121-123, 279. 
4George Bancroft, History of the United States of America, 3: 505, 4: 8, 101-122, 162-
176. 
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such as Bernard. Most modern historians have, like their patriot 
and nationalist counterparts, held Bernard responsible for 
exacerbating disputes over colonial policy and government.5  
Bernard has had his apologists--family members6 and 
former loyal associates7 in the main--who sought reasons for his 
unpopularity in structuralist interpretations of colonial politics. 
In their view, Bernard's loyalty to the Crown was never 
negotiable: despite his dedication to office, the sheer 
unpopularity of British colonial policies and the strong, 
independent-minded ways of the Massachusetts assembly and 
towns rendered Bernard’s position ultimately untenable.  
Bernard’s political role--his involvement in Massachusetts’s 
internal affairs and his part in the formulation of British colonial 
policy--has never been  fully addressed by historians. My 
research aims to answer a simple question---what were the 
political and ideological reasons for Bernard portraying 
otherwise sensible, law-abiding merchants, farmers, lawyers, 
and artisans as rebels?--and proceeds from the assumption that 
Bernard was more than a cog in the mechanism of government, 
but was, as the colonists maintained, an astute and calculating 
politician.  
                                       
5The most detailed account of colonial politics during this period is Leslie J. 
Thomas, "Partisan Politics in Massachusetts During Governor Bernard's 
Administration, 1760-1770," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin, 1960. See also Stephen E. Patterson, Political Parties in Revolutionary 
Massachusetts (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisc., 1973), 52-65; Pauline 
Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of 
American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973), 
esp. 51-53, 73-74, 151-157, 198-227; Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in Revolutionary 
Massachusetts (Academic Press, London, 1977), 84-117; William Pencak, War, 
Politics & Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts (Northeastern University Press, 
Boston, 1981), 172-174, 185-206; Francis G. Walett, "The Massachusetts Council: 
The Transformation of a Conservative Institution," WMQ, 6 (1949), 605-627; 
Bernhard Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution, 1759-1766 (rev.ed., Free 
press, New York, 1961), 184-186; Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, 35-37, 
57, 62-6, 72; John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (ed. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford. Calif., 1959), 238-239, 263; Robert Middlekauf, The 
Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford & New York, 1982), 85-88, 157-158, 162-163.  
6A biography of Bernard by his son Thomas and a family history by his great-grand 
daughter Elizabeth Napier Higgins had very limited circulations. Their "defence" of 
Bernard rested somewhat naively on quoting long extracts from Bernard's papers -
including documents once cited by the Whigs as evidence of his perfidy- with little 
analysis and interpretation; neither they nor the only modern (unpublished) 
biography  by Jordan D. Fiore examined Bernard's political role in much depth. 
Thomas Bernard, Life of Sir Francis Bernard (privately printed, London, 1790) and 
Mrs Napier [Sophie Elizabeth] Higgins, The Bernards of Abington and Nether 
Winchenden: A Family History 4 vols. (Longmans, Green & Co., London 1903-1904); 
Jordan D. Fiore, "Francis Bernard, Colonial Governor", Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Boston University, 1950 
7Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Belknap Press of the University 
of Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Carol Berkin, Jonathan Sewall: Odyssey 
of an American Loyalist (Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1974). 
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In short, Bernard’s alleged duplicity, self-aggrandisement, 
and transparent bouts of pique disguised an urgent quest to 
educate policy-makers in Whitehall and Parliament that royal 
government in Massachusetts was on the verge of collapse. To 
address this situation, Bernard argued that successive 
ministries required to cultivate, through the governor’s office, 
the political support of a hitherto silent but substantial body of 
political opinion in the colonies--the so-called “friends of 
government”--men who were inimical to the radicals’ position on 
imperial affairs, yet sceptical of the expediency and propriety of 
current British policies. A second, complementary issue 
concerned Bernard plans for the reform of the entire colonial 
system, which were intended to curb the political powers of the 
assemblies and towns, where resistance to parliamentary 
authority was considered strongest. 
Bernard’s failure to inspire the friends of government or 
fashion a pro-government coalition in Massachusetts had 
adverse consequences for British-colonial relations. It left the 
provincial administration politically isolated and ineffective. 
However, as Bernard’s standing in Massachusetts deteriorated, 
his  influence in London increased. The realisation that Bernard 
was facing a well organised protest movement prompted Britain 
to adopt a more hawkish colonial policy. On several occasions--
in 1768, in 1770, and in 1774-- when officials and ministers 
were devising some means to deter resistance to British policies, 
Bernard’s analyses of colonial affairs, and his numerous 
proposals for action, proved informative and instructive, though 
not inspirational. 
 
1. 
The principal biographical details of Francis Bernard’s life 
are reasonably familiar to historians of the American Revolution. 
Bernard was the son of an Anglican rector, but both his natural 
parents died while he was still a child. He was raised largely by 
his mother’s second husband, a scholarly cleric, and a maternal 
aunt. He was his educated at England’s oldest public school, 
Westminster, before entering Christ Church College, Oxford. 
After training at the Inns of Court, he married into an 
aristocratic Presbyterian family. A lawyer by profession, Bernard 
left the town of Lincoln in the East Midlands in 1758, at age 
forty-six, to become governor of New Jersey; within eighteen 
months, he was promoted to the governorship of Massachusetts.  
A portly man of medium height, Bernard was depicted by 
Copley at sixty years of age, full of face with ruddy cheeks and 
aquiline nose, dressed in the velvet coat of an English squire 
and a barrister’s short periwig, without the regalia of office his 
daughter Julia thought lent him a more “dignified and 
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distinguished . . . appearance and manner.” Julia’s father had 
enjoyed “robust health” in the colonies, and there is no trace in 
his visage of the stress induced by nine turbulent years as 
governor of Massachusetts; within two years Bernard suffered a 
stroke that effectively ended his involvement in public affairs 
and left him prone to epilepsy. The confident, prepossessing 
mien, which the colonists thought conceited, can also be seen in 
the earliest known portrait of Bernard, commissioned probably 
after he graduated from Oxford aged twenty-four or when he was 
called to the bar in 1737.8 He had good reason why, on the 
threshold of a legal career, he might appear self-satisfied and 
eager. For until he entered the law, Bernard’s prospects had 
been uncertain. 
Bernard was an intelligent, well-educated, earnest, self-
assured man when he arrived in America. By all accounts, he 
was a devoted father to his ten children, and faithful husband to 
his delicate graceful wife Amelia. A patron of the Church of 
England and the liberal arts, he proved himself also an 
architectural draughtsman of some distinction--qualities which 
earned him some muted respect in the colonies.9    Lieutenant-
governor Thomas Hutchinson thought Bernard an agreeable 
companion and a good story teller, but the governor was not a 
naturally gregarious man in America.10  
For now, it is important to examine Bernard’s English 
origins and consider the extent to which the formative 
experiences of the governor’s life in England shaped his later 
responses to colonial Americans. According to nationalist 
interpretations of the Revolution, the antipathy which existed 
between Bernard and the New Englanders can be explained 
largely by basic cultural differences between the ruling British 
elite and Yankee farmers, merchants, and artisans they 
eventually fought on the battlefield. To Bancroft, for example, 
Bernard was an exponent of the ancien regime, who desired 
nothing less than the Anglicisation of colonial life.11 Modern 
historians, however, have proffered another view of Bernard: 
that of an ambitious social climber and administrator, ill at ease 
                                       
8Higgins, The Bernards, 1: 283; 2: 301. Two out of three portraits of Bernard are 
extant. The missing one, also by John Singleton Copley, Bernard donated to 
Harvard College Library after the fire of 1764, but it was mutilated by students in 
October 1768 in protest at the arrival of British troops in Boston. Bernard presented 
Copley's other piece to Chirst Church, Oxford,  in 1772, when he was honoured with 
the  degree of D.C.L. Albert Matthews, The Portraits of Sir Francis Bernard  (The Club 
of Odd Volumes, Boston, 1922). Procs. MHS, second series, 4 (1887-1888), 61.   
9See Thomas Bernard, Life of Sir Francis Bernard (privately printed, London, 1790) 
and Mrs Napier [Sophie Elizabeth] Higgins, The Bernards of Abington and Nether 
Winchenden: A Family History 4 vols. (Longmans, Green & Co., London 1903-1904). 
10Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, 17. 
11George Bancroft, History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the 
Continent 6 vols (ed. London, 1876), 3: 347; 4: 163-164. 
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with robust Calvinist Yankees, and interested only in his 
personal aggrandisement. Edmund and Helen Morgan, in one of 
the most perceptive studies of Bernard’s administration, labelled 
the governor a “parvenu”--an egotistical snob--who knew not, or 
cared, why the Yankees disliked him so.12 Bernard’s only 
modern biographer, Jordan D. Fiore, concluded that Bernard 
was generally no better or worse than the corrupt “civil servants” 
who ran the British government and filled senior administrative 
posts in the colonies. Bernard’s unwillingness to “modify his 
devotion to English manners, customs, and political ideals,” 
Fiore argued, left him singularly unable to “appreciate the 
American point of view.”13 
Bernard was left an orphan at a young age and had no 
patrimony to speak of on reaching adulthood. But his 
aspirations of social mobility matched the stability of Georgian 
England, where opportunities for bright young lawyers such as 
he abounded. Bernard was singularly adept at exploiting patron-
client relationships to win offices in the Church of England and 
local government before embarking on a new career in colonial 
administration. 
Bernard’s pursuit of offices, estates and fortune in England 
and America was unextraordinary for someone of his 
background who was dogged by financial insecurity. But his 
participation on the fringes of British colonial policy-making and 
parliamentary politics were assuredly earnest achievements. For 
many such talented professionals --“superior flunkeys” as Roy 
Porter calls them rather than “parvenus”--membership of the 
provincial and political elites was facilitated by economic 
dependency on the elite, sycophancy, and clientage. Bernard 
fully embraced these social conventions in his relationships with 
his social superiors, and in the colonies exuded attitudes which 
Porter has called an arriviste pride.14 Bernard was the epitome of 
the “superior flunkey.” 
Second, Bernard’s inflated sense of self-worth and 
superiority, which Americans found so irritating, was largely 
defined and shaped by the ideological cohesiveness of the gentry 
and aristocracy of the east Midlands. Several of his friends and 
                                       
12 Edmund S. Morgan and Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to 
Revolution (Collier Books, New York, 1963), 19-35. John W. Tyler, Smugglers & 
Patriots: Boston Merchants and the Advent of the Revolution (Northeastern University 
Press, Boston, 1986), 7; Hiller Zobel, The Boston Massacre (ed. Norton, New York, 
1970), 6-7.  
13Fiore lapsed into romantic nationalism in contending that the political successes 
of the revolutionaries attests to their superior strength of character when measured 
alongside Bernard's deficiencies. Jordan D. Fiore, "Francis Bernard, Colonial 
Governor", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1950, vi, 452-453, 
465.  
14Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth-Century, 21, 64-66, 86. 
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patrons--the Monsons of Lincolnshire, his wife’s cousin, Lord 
Barrington, and several friends on the Bench--were involved in 
government, some in formulating colonial policy. Thus at an 
early stage Bernard was encouraged to think that his 
pronouncements on colonial affairs might meet a receptive 
audience in Whitehall. 
Third, Bernard’s career was made by and coincided with 
the rise of the Whig ascendancy in British politics which 
withstood factionalism, rebellion, and civil disorder several times 
over in his lifetime. Though his parents had flirted with 
Jacobitism, Bernard was a conservative whig not a tory as his 
colonial critics alleged. He countered the spread of radical 
political ideas in the colonies with his own brand of conservative 
whiggism. Like all beleaguered conservatives, he defended that 
which he knew best, proscribing as rebels all those who might 
dare challenge the very institutions which were the font of the 
liberties and “rights of Englishmen” that Americans held so dear.  
Bernard’s appreciation of his own English identity and 
place in the hierarchical eighteenth century world were indeed 
principal reasons for his unpopularity with the colonists. He 
could never understand why Americans railed so much against a 
system of patronage which was the bedrock of British 
government and politics. 
As his American critics rightly claimed, Bernard’s 
appointment as a colonial governor was consistent with the 
exclusive nature of British government, where power in the 
centre rested with a largely aristocratic elite and the mundane 
functions of public administration at home and in the colonies 
were carried out by men of lesser social standing, such as 
Bernard, who had only half-formed notions of acting as 
“disinterested.” civil servants.15  
                                       
15Appointments to minor and major offices were made for a variety of reasons, but it 
would erroneous to think of these men as being public servants in a modern sense 
(as Fiore thought of Bernard). Many were “king’s friends”--political appointees-- 
whose loyalty to George II or George III was more significant than their willingness 
or ability to carry out the job for whch they were selected. "Professionalisation”  was 
most prevalent in central government departments such as in the Admiralty, the 
Customs Board, and the Plantation Office. Bernard’s friend, John Pownall, is 
perhaps the best example of a professional clerk who rose to become Undersecretary 
of State for the American Department, in 1768. His career transcended party 
politics, even though government departments were considered to be within the 
patronage “domain” of the secretaries of state, and he exerted considerable influence 
on policy-making during the 1760s and 1770s. On the other hand, the fortunes and 
careers of men tied to politicians, like Thomas Whately, acleint of George Grenville, 
rose and fell in tandem with those of their masters. Neither Pownall nor Whately can 
be considered “king’s friends” since the origin of their appointments and career 
advancement owed nothing directly to the king’s patronage. Franklin B. Wickwiree, 
“King’s Friends, Civil Servants, or Politicians,” 18-42; Franklin B. Wickwire, “John 
Pownall and British Colonial Policy,” WMQ, 20 (1963): 543-554. 
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It took another ambitious lawyer, James Otis Jr., to 
explain clearly why Bernard’s cultural baggage antagonised 
Americans so. Bernard, screeched Otis, was an “Oxonian, a 
bigot, a plantation governor.” Following in the traditions of tory 
Oxford, Bernard’s “favourite plans,” were “filling his own pockets 
at all hazards, pushing the prerogative of the crown beyond all 
bounds, and propagating high church [of England] principles 
among good peaceable Christians.”16  On another occasion--
during one of the most intense and turbulent town meetings in 
Boston’s colonial history-- Otis purportedly delivered a 
wonderfully sarcastic piece on the British elite and their 
“superior flunkeys” like Bernard. 
 
Pray what are those Men? -They have Titles 'tis 
true, They are rais'd above those whom they are 
pleas'd to stile the Vulgar - they have Badges to 
distinguish themselves- the unthinking Multitudes 
are taught to reverence them as little Deities -for 
what?-not their Virtues sure.- this cannot be the 
case -it is notoriously known there are no set of 
People under the Canopy of Heaven more venal, 
more corrupt and debauch'd in their Principles - Is 
it then for their Superiour [sic] learning? no, by no 
means -Tis true they are sent to the Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge -and pray what do the Learn 
there? -why- nothing at all but Whoring, Smoaking 
and Drinking - a Pious setting out truly - Seven or 
Eight Years spent to a fine Purpose indeed . . . .what 
are those mighty Men that affect to give Laws to the 
Colonies? --a parcel of Button-makers, Pan-makers, 
House Jockeys, Gamesters, Pensioners, Pimps and 
Whore Masters.17 
Undeniably, Bernard’s English origins--his ambitious 
streak, his education, his religious denomination, and his career 
in public administration--represented everything which  Otis 
came despise in the British imperial elite. When Bernard warmly 
defended the royal prerogative and the legitimacy of a loyal 
opposition, Americans chose to ignore the second and condemn 
the first; so too when he stressed the centrality of the Church of 
England in the life of his native land and revelled in Britain’s 
growing imperial power. In these respects, Americans suspected 
Bernard’s political thinking reflected a tory renaissance in 
England. Bernard may have been a conservative whig but to 
                                       
16 Otis to Jasper Mauduit, October 28, 1762, in Worthington C. Ford, "Jasper 
Mauduit Agent in London, 1762-1765," Coll. MHS, 74 (Boston, 1918), 77-78; 
17 Minutes of the Town Meeting of Boston, New England, September 12, 1768, New 
England Papers, II, f.81, Sparks MSS 10. 
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New Englanders, raised in the Puritan traditions of consensual, 
participatory government, his energetic confrontational defence 
of the supremacy of the imperial Parliament marked him out as 
an inflexible tory. Bernard, though, was by no means immune to 
New World influences and was actually more careful in 
advocating the prescriptive tenets of whig ideology and British 
imperialism than the vociferous criticism he attracted might 
suggest. 
 
 
2. 
 
Bernard’s brief tenure as governor of New Jersey is 
historically important for its short-lived success in resolving the 
competing demands of imperial policy-makers in London and 
vested interests in the province over the colony’s contribution to 
the prosecution of the French and Indian War.18  The decline in 
Bernard’s fortunes when he left New Jersey  tends to 
oversimplify his achievements there. Bernard was a novice in 
colonial administration and his years in New Jersey were a 
tough apprenticeship, Bernard won respect because of his 
pragmatism in  adapting quickly to the pluralist nature of New 
Jersey politics, and for attending to the concerns of the elite.  
His administration is noteworthy for the absence of fractious 
politics because circumstances dictated that he address issues 
common to all ethnocultural groups--English Quakers and 
Anglicans, Scots Presbyterians, and Dutch Calvinists,--and also 
because he was able to worked together with dominant ethno-
cultural groups on the most important issues. 
Like other governors, much of Bernard’s time was taken up 
with the difficult problem of persuading the New Jersey 
assembly to part with resources needed to keep Britain’s war 
effort afloat. Bernard’s first major success was to assist in 
negotiating a peace treaty with the Delaware Indians and other 
disaffected tribes. The respite in hostilities along the frontier of 
colonial settlements allowed the New Jersey assembly to 
continue to provide considerable financial and military aid to the 
                                       
18 The most detailed studies are Fiore, "Francis Bernard, Colonial Governor,”27-63, 
454-458 and Donald L. Kemmerer, Path to Freedom: The Struggle for Self-
Government in Colonial New Jersey, 1703-1776 (John E Edwards, Cos Cob, Conn., 
1968), ch.14 "Francis Bernard, Model Governor,. . ." 256-266. See also Aeilt E. 
Sents, "Francis Bernard and Imperial econstruction", Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, 1973, 32-42; John E. Pomfret, 
Colonial New Jersey, A History (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1973), 174-175; 
Paul A. Stillhorn and Michael J. Birkner, eds., The Governors of New Jersey 1664-
1974: Biographical Essays (The New Jersey Historical Commission, c. 1982), 63-65; 
Burns, Controversies Between Royal Governors and their Assemblies in the North 
American Colonies, 409; Purvis, Proprietors, Patronage, and Paper Money,170. 
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Crown. Bernard’s second test, the matter of preventing the 
assembly funding regiments with  currency was more politically 
sensitive, but he engineered a short-term compromise 
acceptable to both Britain and New Jersey, whereby the ministry 
modified its currency policy and the assembly agreed to issue 
bills of credit under specific restraints.  The New Jersey 
legislature considered Bernard as an accomplished advocate of 
provincial interests, whereas in Massachusetts, he was to be 
accused of mismanagement and corruption.  
 
 
3. 
 
New Jersey had been a sobering experience in the politics 
of colonial administration. The governance of empire, Bernard 
trusted, would not prove so taxing in Massachusetts. Bernard’s 
path of good intentions was signposted with a conviction to 
remain above internal disputes, to avoid the hazard of 
interfering too much in the business of the legislature, and to 
promote colonial interests generally. As he strove to realise these 
objectives, Bernard preferred to appeal to the colonists’ sense of 
imperial identity and their loyalty to the king than to engage in 
covert political management. “Party is no more,” Bernard 
announced, “it is resolved into Loyalty. Whig and Tory, Court 
and Country are swallowed up in the Name of Briton; a Name 
which has received an additional honour by his majesty's 
[George III] public assumption of it.”19 Bernard’s design to 
establish a “broad bottom” administration reflected his own 
understanding of the reason why the Duke Newcastle had 
enjoyed such a long administration in England. Bernard, like the 
duke, regarded the liberal disbursement of patronage posts as 
one sure means of building up a loyal core of support and of 
institutionalising dissent from other quarters. 
 The efficacy of such an approach was undermined when 
the colonists began to divide over several contentious issues 
concerning the application of imperial authority in 
Massachusetts’s polity.  Opposition to Bernard was led by the 
popular party in Boston, based on the town’s  “caucuses” and 
merchants’ committees. Merchants, traders, professionals, and 
artisans were alarmed by the concentration of power in the 
hands of the Hutchinson-Oliver clique. In the legislature too, 
political divisions increasingly reflected antagonistic positions on 
British colonial policy between the governor’s so-called “court” 
faction and the “popular” or “country” party led by the Otis 
family. As Marc Egnal has shown, the French and Indian War 
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changed the terms of political debate by focusing attention on 
the possibilities--and the obstacles in its path--for American 
commercial expansion.20  
Massachusetts’ governors had few legitimate political tools 
at their disposal to enforce the royal will on a recalcitrant 
assembly or council. In short, as Bernard quickly realised, the 
political weakness of royal governors was a consequence of the 
growth in power of the assemblies and the provincial elites. 
Governors would normally expect to work with rather than 
against established local networks of elite office-holders in the 
Massachusetts towns, but the weakening of deference tended to 
circumscribe the effectiveness of these networks. Traditional 
notions of deference to an entrenched elite, which acted as a 
counter-weight to grass roots involvement in provincial and 
municipal affairs, were being diluted by increasing popular 
participation in politics. Of particular concern to royal officials in 
Massachusetts was, by English standards, the comparatively 
wide franchise in provincial and local elections.21  The 
distribution and locus of political power in colonial America, 
therefore, could not sustain any notion of a monarchical, socio-
political hierarchy on English Walpolean models, however much 
Bernard or any other Briton might yearn for such.22  Moreover, 
Bernard became apprehensive that partisanship and the onset 
of popular protests against British colonial policies were bringing 
about a redistribution of political power in the towns and in the 
assembly.  
 
4. 
 
The dispute over the enforcement of the trade laws and the 
introduction of a  stamp duty was the first of several issues 
which Bernard suggested Britain might treat as pretexts to 
reorganise the empire and resolve at least some of Americans’ 
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grievances. For Bernard and other advocates of colonial reform, 
the end of the French Wars was an opportune moment for 
Britain to have begun the reconstruction of colonial 
administration. The Seven Years War, as Richard Middleton has 
shown, did not make imperial administration any more effective 
in overcoming the basic limitations of geography and poor lines 
of communication.23 (More often than not, non-controversial 
matters would lie in abeyance for several months with one or 
other of the  agencies involved in colonial policy-making.24) In 
general, the stimulus for administrative reform in the early 
1760s derived largely from the widely recognised need to 
improve the efficiency of royal government, maintain imperial 
security, and raise some revenue.. Long before either Bernard or 
the colonists knew for certain that a stamp tax was to be 
enforced by parliament, Bernard advocated that the British 
government take pre-emptive action to assuage American 
concerns over taxation. 25  Bernard’s interim solution was  that 
provincial assemblies should determine their own taxes for 
internal government and American representation in parliament 
be established.26 The rest of Bernard’s proposals were more 
controversial, intended as they were to undermine the political 
power of the colonial assemblies that trammelled royal 
government. 
Lords Barrington, Halifax, and Hillsborough were certainly 
attracted to Bernard’s plans, but more from curiosity than 
enthusiasm for radical reform. They were probably annoyed by 
his criticism of the molasses duty, but listened attentively 
nonetheless. Arguably, the advice of customs officials Benjamin 
Hallowell and John Temple, and subministers like Thomas 
Whately, was more important in convincing Grenville to ignore 
colonial opposition to the prospective stamp tax.27  The 
Rockingham ministry, which took office in June 1765, had no 
incentive to reconstruct colonial administration when it was 
preoccupied with American resistance to the stamp tax.28 Only 
when, two years after the repeal of the Stamp Act, American 
resistance to parliamentary authority showed little sign of 
abating, did Hillsborough set out to convince the Grafton-
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Chatham ministry that there was considerable worth in some of 
Bernard’s more controversial ideas.  
Despite his protestations that he had had nothing to do 
with the introduction of the Stamp tax, Bernard was unable to 
show the colonists that he had done much to prevent its passage 
through Parliament, though did deliver some forcible arguments 
against the Revenue Act.  Indeed while several key figures in the 
Massachusetts government, including Bernard, criticised the 
Stamp Act they did so largely after the Stamp Act Riots had 
precipitated a crisis of governmental authority; only lieutenant-
governor Hutchinson had actively campaigned against its 
introduction. Bernard’s instinctive caution was in striking 
contrast to the energetic leadership provided by Stephen 
Hopkins, governor of neighbouring Rhode Island and the author 
of influential pamphlet  The Rights of the Colonies Examined.29  
The second major political realignment of Bernard’s 
administration began in 1764 and 1765 as popular reaction to 
parliamentary taxation and trade regulation gathered pace.   The 
people and politicians of Massachusetts began to use terms such 
as “popular party” and “friends of government” or “whig” and 
“tory” and to distinguish a new set of viewpoints, defined by 
reactions to the Grenvillian programme, in the towns and the 
General Court, in preference to labels like “court” and “country.”  
If Bernard thought Otis an enigma, he regarded the radical 
whig Samuel Adams as an out-and-out revolutionary, but held 
them both equally to blame for poisoning the minds of other 
colonists. Bernard’s interpretation of the Stamp Act Crisis was 
based on the assumption that the colonial protest movement 
had been engineered by an industrious minority of extremists. 
These demagogues, in setting out to persuade decision-makers 
in London to overturn Grenville’s reforms, had undermined the 
governor’s position as a mediator, and, in resorting to crowd 
action, had raised the spectre of social levelling.  It was a short  
step for Bernard to suggest that the monster of “mobocracy” 
could not easily be laid to rest by the lawyers, merchants, and 
artisans who had raised it.  
Fear of social conflict and civil disorder was a pervasive 
theme in Bernard’s political thinking and strategy after the 
Stamp Act riots. Some historians have suggested that this was 
Bernard’s most serious political error, for in portraying middle-
class colonists, who embraced libertarian whig ideas, as class-
conscious revolutionaries, he misinterpreted and misrepresented 
the social and ideological bases of the protest movement.30 
However, there was an element of class consciousness among 
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Boston’s lower orders, who were certainly politicised by the 
Stamp Act Crisis, which was harnessed by the whig leadership 
in the coming years.31  
When Francis Bernard chose to employ the imagery of 
social conflict and civil war, he aimed to exploit perceptions 
rather more than actualities. The gross unpopularity of the 
Stamp Act precluded any attempt by Bernard to seek support for 
British policies per se; instead, Bernard focused the colonists’ 
attention on the nascent ideological divisions created by the 
crisis of governmental authority. Bernard resorted to making 
what he called “argumentative speeches” on imperial affairs, 
reducing the complexities of political and theoretical arguments 
to a simple choice of principles, a kind of ideological blackmail 
where the colonists’ response was measurable on a sliding scale 
between loyalty and disloyalty to the Crown and parliament. 
How, he argued, could the colonists’ genuine concerns over 
taxation and commerce be reconciled with violent resistance to 
an act of parliament and the destruction of private property? 
Bernard warned of dire social consequences arising from direct 
crowd action and of British retribution if the assembly were to 
persist with contentious declarations of colonial legislative 
rights; it was a nightmarish chimera of war, chaos, and social 
levelling. 
Bernard’s “argumentative speeches” were designed largely 
for the friends of government and the moderate whigs, whose 
political support he deemed vital in order to maintain royal 
government. The province may not have been on the verge of 
anarchy, as Bernard asserted, but many colonists were clearly 
apprehensive about the prospect of ever changing ministers’ 
views on taxation after the Stamp Act riots of August 1765. 
Bernard’s subsequent refusal to support the General Court in 
nullifying the act created deep ideological divisions among the 
provincial elite.  
The friends of government were the embodiment of 
antirevolutionary opinion in Massachusetts. First, they came to 
challenge the Whigs’ interpretations of American constitutional 
rights - particularly the restrictions that the radicals placed on 
the scope of parliamentary authority in the colonies. The friends 
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of government, like the whigs, professed a faith in the 
constitutional arrangements settled by the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688-1689 and the Massachusetts Charter. They also 
admitted that the colonists had grievances over taxation, but 
they could see no conspiracy afoot to undermine their liberties. 
While both the friends of government and the whigs were 
committed to upholding the  legitimacy of parliamentary 
opposition, the friends of government publicly voiced concern 
that resistance to acts of Parliament presaged an “internal 
revolution” in the colony.  
Second, the friends of government rejected outright the 
political strategy employed by the whigs to defeat British policies 
- a strategy based on campaigning through both conventional 
constitutional methods and extralegal protests. The preferred 
method of safeguarding fundamental liberties was for the 
colonists to endure hardship temporarily, whilst the assembly 
and governor negotiated with the British government for relief.  
 
5.  
 
However, as Bernard found out, the friends of government 
could not be relied upon. Both friends of government and 
moderate whigs in the Council and House of Representatives 
combined to defeat Bernard’s law-and-order initiatives, among 
which was the proposal to ask Britain to send a regiment or two 
of regular troops to Boston. Analysis of the largely negative 
responses of the friends of government to Bernard’s efforts to 
build up a conservative-moderate coalition helps to illustrate the 
basic shift in political power in the mid-1760s, away from the 
governor’s close circle of advisers to a broad-based movement for 
colonial self-government. High turnover rates in annual House 
membership prevented the development of a partisan 
infrastructure among the friends of government. While some 
gains were made in 1767 and 1768, the friends of government 
were reduced to a rump in 1769 from which they never 
recovered.32 Despite the incessant rumours and his  bouts of 
depression, Bernard never abandoned his sanguine view of the 
friends of government.  
Bernard projected the redistribution of political power into 
the arena of imperial decision-making, demonstrating that the 
consensual foundation of royal government was essentially 
inoperative in the matter of trade laws, taxation, or any 
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controversial issue originating in London.33 When it came to 
formulating a response to the American crisis, ministers relied 
heavily on Bernard’s reports,34 but largely in spite of rather than 
because of the their alarmist tone. Only Newcastle, who had 
joined Rockingham in opposition to Grenville when he resigned 
office in 1762,35 was prepared to accept without question the 
veracity and reliability of Bernard’s reports.36 Bernard probably 
convinced Rockingham’s secretary of state, Henry Seymour 
Conway, and the cabinet to consider the possibility of sending 
British regiments to Boston. But the circular Conway issued 
Bernard and the other colonial governors on October 24, 1765 
gave no such explicit commitment; instead General Gage and 
Admiral Colville were placed on a state of alert to respond to any 
request for troops made by a provincial governor and council. 
P.D.G Thomas has interpreted this decision as a “piece of face-
saving, promulgated to avoid any subsequent charge of 
negligence.” Paul Langford, however, sees the circular as 
confirming the ministry’s intention of seeking a military solution 
to the Stamp Act Crisis before repeal of the act became 
government policy in February. A more recent explanation by 
John L. Bullion tends to corroborate Langford,  for Conway’s 
circular was implicitly critical of royal governors generally and 
Bernard in particular for not asking Gage for assistance when 
the riots first occurred.37  
6. 
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The introduction Townshend Acts in 1767 produced 
widespread American resistance to any form of parliamentary 
taxation and to the Chancellor Townshend’s scheme of using 
some of the revenue to pay Crown salaries to colonial governors. 
The Townshend duties controversy and the attendant disputes 
over the nonconsumption and nonimportation agreements 
generated internal divisions within the General Court and the 
commercial communities of Boston and the eastern 
Massachusetts, which Bernard proved remarkably inept at 
exploiting. 
 One reason was continued speculation over Bernard’s role 
during the Stamp Act, which undermined confidence in his 
administration. 
A second was the fact that Bernard himself warmly 
approved the underlying purpose of Townshend’s reforms, which 
intended to use colonial revenue to establish an extended 
colonial civil list: this overrode any residual sympathy he may 
have had for colonists when they were presented with another 
round of taxes and also diluted some of his more pointed 
criticism of the ministry for landing his administration with 
another apparently insurmountable political problem. Bernard’s 
stubborn defence of Townshend might be thought consistent 
with the behaviour  of a man denied recognition for pinpointing 
first the shaky political foundations of Britain’s American 
empire.38  
 For their part, the whigs came to regard Bernard with 
deep mistrust, and with some justification. Representatives who, 
in 1765, had flinched at Samuel Adams’s suggestion that they 
vote down the Stamp Act, and thought twice about rejecting out 
of hand parliament’s right to tax the colonists, rediscovered the 
confidence to flout the instructions of the king’s ministers after a 
barrage of criticism from their governor. So too Bernard’s reports 
on politics and government were amplified by his observations 
on crowds and mobs which frustrated the Custom House in 
executing the Townshend Acts and trade laws. Time and again, 
he returned to pessimistic themes he had first explored during 
the Stamp Act Crisis and from 1768 onwards Bernard 
consistently portrayed crowds as more threatening than they 
probably were and ascribed to their participants and 
representatives in the legislature a more clearly defined 
revolutionary agenda than any--even Samuel Adams--surely 
possessed.  
As Bernard’s administration floundered, the Earl of 
Hillsborough, won the backing of the cabinet to send four 
regiments of British soldiers to Boston for the support of the civil 
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government. Hillsborough,  as historian John Reid and others 
have shown, was effectively misled by Bernard and the 
Commissioners of Customs into supposing that royal 
government in the province was on the verge of collapse. 
Hillsborough in particular accepted uncritically the 
“impressions” of imminent civil disorder conveyed by Bernard 
and the Commissioners of Customs in their reports about the 
assault and intimidation of Customs officers in Boston of March 
and June, 1768.39  
New Englanders had grown obdurate to their governor’s 
lamentations on the state of government. That, however, did not 
cushion the blow of September 3, when they learned that the 
14th and 26th regiments at Halifax were on their way to Boston. 
Bernard first heard of the cabinet’s change of mind on the 
deployment of British Regulars from General Gage at New York 
two or three days earlier, and broke the ominous news to the 
Council.40 The governor, as one American remarked was now 
“caught in a snare” of his own devising.41  The arrival of British 
Regulars cost Bernard whatever political credibility remained to 
him in Massachusetts. While Bernard never attempted to deny 
that his reports had influenced ministers, few persons outwith 
his administration believed him when he denied having asked 
Gage or Hillsborough for British regiments. Even if the radicals 
did not obstruct the landing of the troops, the governor 
henceforth encountered opposition from the majority of the 
Council, the town authorities, and the province magistracy to 
any request to find billets and provisions for the soldiers-- all of 
which Bernard took as evidence of the fragility of royal 
government in the province.42  
 
9. 
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The colonists did not lack able advocates--men who knew 
Bernard and understood American affairs and who were 
prepared to contest his interpretation of developments in 
Massachusetts. Because of Bernard’s reports on civil disorder, 
Benjamin Franklin, the agent for Pennsylvania, worried that 
everyone--himself included--had lost sight of the fundamental 
constitutional and economic issues raised by the colonists in 
protesting at the Townshend Acts.43 The Massachusetts agent, 
Dennis De Berdt, the Council’s agent William Bollan, and former 
governor Thomas Pownall, M.P. and all did what they could to 
counteract Bernard’s version of events in Boston. John Wilkes 
too found time to assist his American friends by ridiculing 
Bernard. The Rockinghamites were the most vocal of the 
opposition factions which berated Hillsborough for relying too 
much on information supplied by Bernard.  
The King’s Speech to both Houses of Parliament on 
November 8, 1768, which proclaimed Boston to be “in a state of 
disobedience to all law and government,” left Parliament baying 
for action. For Hillsborough, it was not an unwelcome scenario, 
but ministers found it difficult to manipulate the House of 
Commons. Anger and ridicule toward the insolent Yankees 
punctuated Commons debates. When Bernard’s reports were 
produced, possibly at Hillsborough’s instigation, they electrified 
the proceedings. When the House had finished preparing a reply 
to the King, Hans Stanley, the placeman who had asked for the 
reports, moved an amendment proposing that Bernard’s 
proposal for a mandamus Council be adopted. No-one seconded 
Stanley’s motion. Indeed, when the debate moved on to the 
ministry’s response to the Massachusetts circular letter, the call 
for a full Parliamentary enquiry into affairs in Massachusetts 
came from the Rockinghamite whigs on the opposition benches -
-William Dowdeswell, Sir George Savil, and Edmund Burke.44  
The Attorney-General William De Gray did not find enough 
evidence in Bernard’s reports themselves to justify legal 
proceedings to annul the Massachusetts Charter,45 but did, 
however, suggest that there  was a prima facie case to be 
answered. Hillsborough was informed that under an archaic act 
of Parliament--the 35th Henry VIII--Parliament could form itself 
into a special commission to hear cases of treason or misprision 
of treason arising in the colonies. De Gray’s opinion cannot be 
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taken as a vindication of Bernard’s analysis and interpretation of 
the state of public affairs in Massachusetts. Bernard would have 
to identify the Boston selectment who organised the Convention, 
and, a more difficult task, supply  corroborating documentation 
as to what had been said by Otis and others at the Boston town 
meeting of September 12; a nigh impracticable suggestion was 
that Bernard produce evidence of “any design laid or persons 
Names, or times appointed, or other measures taken, for Seizing 
Castle William.” 46 On November 15, Bernard was instructed to  
enquire into the “illegal and unconstitutional Acts” committed in 
the province during and after the Liberty riot of June 10, and 
bring the “perpetrators” to justice.47  
On December 18, Hillsborough moved a series of 
contentious resolutions in the House of Lords, which bore his 
hawkish stamp. The resolutions incorporated most of what 
Bernard had been claiming was seditious and treasonable (save 
in matters which related to New York) but they did not actually 
propose a programme of action. The declarations of the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives in January and 
February, 1768, which questioned Parliament’s right to levy 
taxes, was said to be in effect a “denial” of Parliament’s 
legislative supremacy; most colonists would have  been appalled 
at such an interpretation. So too they would have balked at the 
description of the circular letter as an attempt to organise an 
“illegal combination” against Parliament and the Crown. The 
third, fourth, and fifth resolutions asked the Lords to endorse 
Bernard’s conclusion that the return of crowd action to Boston 
in the spring and summer of 1768 produced a “State of great 
disorder and Confusion,” which both the Council and the 
magistracy neglected to address, and which justified the 
deployment of British Regulars. The remaining resolutions were 
accepted uncritically--despite De Gray’s worries about the 
absence of evidence: the proceedings of the Boston town meeting 
on June 14 and September 12, and the Convention of Towns 
were declared “illegal and Unconstitutional . . . [and] 
subversive.”48 The resolutions were approved by the Lords after 
the Christmas recess and by the Commons in last week of 
January, 1769.49 
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On February 13, Hillsborough finally presented the cabinet 
with a set of stringent measures reflecting the spirit of what 
Bernard had been urging If the Massachusetts legislature 
continued to deny Parliamentary supremacy then Council 
should hereafter be appointed directly by the Crown instead of 
being elected by the House; and Bernard should be given a 
discretionary power to move the General Court from Boston. No 
mention was made of bringing rebels to trial in England. There 
was an olive branch of sorts for the “doves,” which might have 
involved Parliament repealing the Townshend Acts in the West 
Indies and Virginia where permanent provision for the governor’s 
salary had already been made.50  
The cabinet was unable to agree on precisely what they 
should do to in punish Massachusetts. Few if any were prepared 
to go so far as to revoke the province Charter or establish a 
mandamus Council: the prime minister, the Duke of Grafton 
and the Lord Chancellor, Camden, wisely rejected these 
measures; so too did the King (who had probably discussed such 
ideas in his weekly meetings with Secretary-at War Lord 
Barrington, Amelia Bernard’s cousin) By March 24, only two of 
Hillsborough’s several major recommendations were approved by 
the cabinet: that the Bernard  be allowed to summon the 
General Court to a place outside Boston such as Salem, and 
that his request for leave to report back to Whitehall be 
confirmed.51   For next three months, the ministry vacillated on 
whether to punish Boston, while it considered whether or not to 
try and end the American protests by repealing the Townshend 
Acts. The cabinet decided on the latter course  in May, 1769, 
and the Townshend duties were partially repealed in March 
1770.52 
For more than three months, while he waited directions 
from London, Bernard secretly compiled evidence of sedition. 
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First there were the Boston selectmen who had issued the 
precept inviting the Massachusetts towns to the Convention: 
Joseph Jackson, the colonel of the Boston militia, who refused 
to call out his men during the Stamp Act riots; John Ruddock, 
the irascible notary public, whose political sympathies were 
incompatible with his magistrate’s duties; John Hancock, the 
bête noire of the Commissioners of Customs and “Milch Cow” of 
the faction, as he was dubbed by one conservative; wealthy 
merchants John Rowe and Samuel Pemberton; the town clerk, 
William Cooper; and Thomas Cushing, perhaps the most 
moderate of the whig leaders, yet whose revelations about a 
possible coup d’état had left Bernard’s spy, Customs officer, 
Nathaniel Coffin, reeling. Parliament, Bernard mused, had 
sufficient reason to introduce legislation barring these men from 
holding local or provincial office (in much the same way as the 
government were trying to oust John Wilkes from the House of 
Commons.) Parliamentary intervention was also suggested as 
the only means possible of taming the province magistracy and  
establishing a mandamus  Council. 
 
 
10. 
 
On Saturday April 5, 1769 a package sent by the Council’s 
agent William Bollan to councillor James Bowdoin, in the brig 
Last Attempt arrived in Boston containing copies of six letters 
written by Bernard. The letters were written to the American 
Secretary, the Earl of Hillsborough, between November 1 an 
December 5, 1768, and concerned mainly with Bernard’s 
deteriorating relationship with the Council; others were soon 
published as quickly as they arrived in Boston. Throughout 
Bernard had freely discoursed on the possibilities of Parliament 
revoking the Province Charter and establishing a mandamus 
Council. This was evidence enough for most colonists of a 
manifest assault on their  liberties and of their governor 
pursuing a private vendetta leading colonists.53  
There were no dissenting voices when the House of 
Representatives and Council debated the contents of Bernard’s 
letters. On June 27, the 109 members of the House 
unanimously voted to send a petition to the King requesting 
Bernard’s dismissal from office. A draft had already been 
prepared by a House committee including both Otises, Speaker 
Thomas Cushing, and John Hancock, accusing Bernard of 
conspiring to “overthrow the present constitution of government 
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in this colony, and to have the people deprived of their 
invaluable charter rights.” It too was unanimously approved. 
When on June 28 Bernard informed the assembly  that he was 
returning home on leave to Britain,54  the House refused to grant 
him his annual salary . 
The assembly’s petition contained two principal charges 
against Bernard: that he had exceeded the terms of his royal 
commissions and broken the governor’s contractual obligations 
to the commonwealth of Massachusetts set out in the charter. 
Colonial complaints about governors or other officials were 
normally heard by Privy Council, the last court of appeal for 
Americans.  If found guilty Bernard faced a range of severe 
penalties: immediate dismissal, a ban sine die from any other 
crown office, and a fine of £1,000; he was of course also subject 
to the full penalty of law for any other specific crimes 
committed.55 (No royal  governor had ever been amerced on the 
allegations with which Bernard was charged. While allegations of 
corruption were commonplace in the colonies, only one royal 
governor, Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts, had ever been 
dismissed before, and that was on the more specific issue of 
breaking the trade laws.56) 
Bernard arrived in London in early September to a 
“reception,” which Hutchinson thought “was beyond his own 
expectation.” Bernard asked Barrington and Hillsborough to try 
and get the petition referred to the Privy Council immediately, 
where Bernard could count on the support of several friends, the 
most important of whom were Hillsborough, Barrington, Wilbore 
Ellis, Lord Chief Justice Wilmot, and Lord Sandys. Though he 
welcomed the opportunity to clear his name Bernard was wary 
that bureaucratic delays might give De Berdt more time to 
prepare the colony’s case.57  The charges against Bernard were 
peremptorily dismissed on March 7 as “groundless, vexatious 
and scandalous.”58 . 
In June 1770, Bernard participated in a Privy Council  
inquiry into Massachusetts. set up in the wake of the Boston 
Massacre. The committee’s proceedings focused largely on a 
report presented by John Pownall, Undersecretary for America, 
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which reflected much of what he had discussed with Bernard 
over the years. 59 The report was updated and used again in 
1774, after the Boston Tea Party.) The committee considered the 
report and oral evidence at three separate meeting held between 
June 26 July 4. Bernard and four other witnesses were 
examined under oath  All the witnesses, save one--an employee 
of John Hancock--, corroborated the view advanced in Bernard’s 
letters and the reports of the Customs Commissioners that the 
trade laws could not be enforced; that  the governor had lost the 
support of the Council and assembly, which the friends of 
government no longer attended; and that the boycott was being 
illegally enforced by crowds and ad hoc committees of 
townspeople. In short, as Bernard argued, parliament needed to 
intervene in Massachusetts in order to restore law and order. 60 
 
11. 
 
When he relinquished the governorship of Massachusetts 
in 1771, Bernard continued to exert influence on Britain's 
American policy in a semi-official capacity. as an advisor to the 
Plantation Office and the Earl of Hillsborough.61 The stroke he 
suffered  sometime between May 1771 and January 1772 greatly 
restricted his participation in public affairs. But many of the 
reform ideas he had discussed with John Pownall, and others, 
had greater appeal for British politicians in 1774, when they 
were thinking hard of some means to make the town of Boston 
corporately liable or the destruction of the East India Company’s 
tea and to punish the province for the transgressions of the 
House, the Council, and the magistracy. Bernard’s ideas formed 
the basis of two of the four Coercive Acts--the Massachusetts 
Government Act and the Administration of Justice Act--which 
precipitated violent resistance in Massachusetts in the summer 
and autumn of 1774. And yet, when Hutchinson tried to avert 
the introduction of  these measures he might have recalled 
ruefully his efforts to persuade Bernard and Britain to consider 
a less ferocious attack on colonial institutions. 62  
 
12. 
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The political emasculation of royal government begun 
during Bernard’s administration was completed during those of 
his successors: Thomas Hutchinson and General Thomas Gage. 
By the autumn of 1774, the Whigs were in firm political control 
of the General Court and the town meetings. From a position of 
dominance, they were able successfully to expand  resistance to 
the Coercive Acts.  In short, although the friends of government 
shared a proto-loyalist ideology, they were effectively broken as a 
provincial political force before the outbreak of war.  
While the ideological bases for a loyalist counter-revolution 
in 1775 may be found in the reactions of governor Bernard and 
the friends of government to the political controversies of the 
1760s and early 1770s, its political form never fully developed 
after Bernard's departure for England. The political orthodoxy 
demanded of the populace by the radicals fulfilled its dual 
purpose of mobilising popular opinion on behalf of the protest 
movement and discouraging active support for the provincial 
administration. While the friends of government in the 
legislature found common cause with the governors on several 
occasions they lacked the organisation and common purpose of 
the leaders of the protest movement necessary to sustain an 
anti-radical coalition; similarly, the friends of government in the 
town meetings throughout the colony were minority factions 
bereft of popular support. They functioned neither as a court 
faction--similar to the "King's Friends" in George III's Britain--
nor, to any great extent, as a popular loyalist force like the 
“Church and King” mobs which were endemic to Britain at the 
time of the French Revolution and so effective in stifling popular 
radicalism.  
In consequence, the loyalist counter-revolution in 
Massachusetts ended before it had scarcely begun. In 1775, it 
comprised the formation of militia units to defend Boston and 
sporadic loyalist uprisings against the patriot authorities in only 
a handful of towns. Following the withdrawal of British troops 
from Boston in March 1776 and the defeat of General 
Burgoyne's army at Bennington and Saratoga in 1777, the 
British could offer no substantial military assistance to 
Massachusetts's loyalists and would-be loyalists, leaving the 
patriot government free to proscribe intractable opponents at 
will, to confiscate the property of absentee proprietors like 
Bernard and loyalist émigrés, and generally -as they had 
managed successfully since 1765--to discourage dissenters from 
taking a more active role in politics until the War of 
Independence drew to a close. 63  
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13. Issues for Discussion 
 
• Bernard’s biographical profile 
inc. Bernard’s private life 
 
• Comparison with other royal governors 
• Massachusetts Politics 
 
• Historiography 
 
Revolution 
Loyalists 
Britain & American Revolution.  
 
• Evaluation of Bernard’s role in coming of American 
Revolution 
 
